











































	 The	work	required	to	achieve	this	would	be	considerable.	The	phenomenological	and	epistemic	routes	considered	above	are	hopeless.	Moreover,	one	can	make	trouble	for	(SA)	itself.	For	example,	even	if	a	philosopher	takes	herself	to	have	worked	out	a	convincing	proof	of,	say,	compatibilism	about	free	will,	she	might	nonetheless	find	that	the	proposition	‘Free	will	and	determinism	are	compatible’	seems	false—especially	if	she	has	not	recently	rehearsed	the	proof	for	herself.	Nonetheless,	it	is	hard	to	see	how	there	would	be	anything	dishonest	in	asserting	that	proposition,	if	in	fact	she	believes	it	in	the	face	of	the	recalcitrant	seeming.	If	this	is	correct,	then	it	is	possible	to	assert	something	honestly	even	if	it	seems	to	one	to	be	false.	But	let	us	put	these	worries	aside	and	focus	on	the	very	idea	that	the	way	things	seem	to	a	person	could	be	the	privileged	source	of	evidence	through	which	she	attains	non-alienated,	distinctively	first-personal	knowledge	of	her	belief.		 	The	deeper	problem	with	the	appeal	to	(SA)	as	a	defense	of	the	empirical	conception	is	that	there	is	no	good	reason	why,	if	honest	assertion	is	a	matter	saying	what	one	knows	oneself	to	believe	and	the	evidence	constituted	by	seeming-truth	is	good	enough	to	confer	this	knowledge,	then	evidence	of	other	kinds—i.e.,	the	kinds	operative	in	the	cases	of	the	Perceptive	Introspector	and	the	Faithful	Patient—wouldn’t	be	good	enough	as	well.	This	concern	is	especially	pressing	when	we	recognize	the	extent	to	which	how	things	seem	to	a	person	is	not	an	infallible	indication	of	what	she	believes,	as	the	Basic	Case	and	our	variants	on	it	all	bring	out.	If	we	accept	that	there	are	cases	where	a	belief	is	better	known	‘third-personally’	than	from	the	inside,	then	as	long	as	the	role	of	seeming-truth	in	doxastic	self-knowledge	is	understood	in	empirical	terms	there	is	no	reason	why	it	should	be	impossible	honestly	to	assert	a	belief	that	one	knows	of	only	through	these	other	kinds	of	evidence.	The	distinction	between	the	right	and	wrong	sorts	of	empirical	process	is	entirely	ad	hoc,	and	raises	the	suspicion	that	this	requirement	is	a	strained	attempt	to	accommodate	a	very	different	truth	using	the	wrong	set	of	resources.13		 We	conclude	that	(SA)	will	not	help	in	defending	the	empirical	conception	against	our	arguments.	It	is	time	to	propose	an	alternative.		 																																																									13	A	further	problem	with	this	reply	is	that	even	if	there	is	some	intuitive	pull	to	the	thought	that	honest	assertion	requires	the	seeming-truth	of	the	asserted	proposition,	there	is	none	at	all	to	the	idea	that	this	requirement	is	due	to	the	way	that	seeming-truth	provides	a	special	sort	of	evidence	for	what	one	believes.	If	the	proposal	in	question	were	correct	(as	we	have	argued	it	is	not),	it	would	be	correct	only	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	it	flies	in	the	face	of	the	phenomenology	of	doxastic	self-knowledge.		
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8.	 We	have	argued	that	the	empirical	conception	of	doxastic	self-knowledge	makes	it	impossible	to	understand	the	first-personal	grasp	of	one’s	beliefs	that	is	required	for	honest	assertion.	This	is	not	only	because	there	is	no	credible	account	of	the	empirical	process	that	could	permit	such	a	grasp,	but	also	because	the	idea	that	some	empirical	processes	can	ground	the	required	self-knowledge,	while	other	processes	that	are	otherwise	equally	reliable	will	not	do	in	this	respect,	is	unmotivated.	The	conclusion	we	draw	from	this	is	that	when	honest	assertion	is	possible	it	must	arise	from	a	grasp	of	one’s	beliefs	that	is	not	grounded	in	evidence	of	any	sort.	Following	Moran	(2001)	and	others,	we	can	state	this	conclusion	by	saying	that	ordinary	self-knowledge	of	one’s	beliefs,	i.e.	the	sort	of	assertion	that	allows	one	to	assert	those	beliefs	honestly,	is	transparent	to	belief	itself.		 The	idea	that	doxastic	self-knowledge	is	transparent	finds	a	classic	formulation	in	a	familiar	passage	from	Gareth	Evans’s	Varieties	of	Reference:		 	…	in	making	a	self-ascription	of	belief,	one’s	eyes	are,	so	to	speak,	or	occasionally	literally,	directed	outward—upon	the	world.	If	someone	asks	me	‘Do	you	think	there	is	going	to	be	a	third	world	war?’,	I	must	attend,	in	answering	him,	to	precisely	the	same	outward	phenomena	as	I	would	attend	to	if	I	were	answering	the	question	‘Will	there	be	a	third	world	war?	(Evans	[1982,	225]		Against	the	empirical	conception,	we	propose	that	it	is	only	when	doxastic	self-knowledge	is	transparent	to	belief	in	the	way	described	by	Evans	that	a	person	can	assert	her	belief	honestly.	Only	to	the	extent	that	a	person	knows	her	belief	transparently	can	she	follow	the	rule	(BA)	by	expressing	this	belief	in	honest	assertion,	speaking	from	its	point	of	view	just	as	Zoe	calls	the	zookeeper	because	she	believes	that	there’s	a	pink	elephant	in	the	bathtub.	One	who	speaks	in	this	way	is	not	merely	asserting	what	she	believes	(as	does	Would-Be	Liar	does),	is	not	merely	asserting	what	she	believes	or	knows	herself	to	believe	(as	do	the	Lucky	Spiritualist,	Faithful	Patient	and	Perceptive	Introspector).	She	is	asserting	that	p	in	light	of	the	(putative)	fact	that	p.	She	speaks	honestly,	because	she	is	speaking	from	the	point	of	
the	view	of	the	belief	she	expresses.	Still	one	might	wonder:	How	is	it	so	much	as	possible	that	a	person	could	have	non-empirical	knowledge	of	her	beliefs?	The	argument	of	this	paper	does	not	depend	on	any	specific	answer	to	this	question,	but	it	does	rule	out	a	misinterpretation	of	the	notion	of	transparency	that	has	gained	some	currency	in	
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the	literature.14	According	to	this	misinterpretation,	transparent	self-knowledge	arises	from	a	process	of	the	following	form:			
Step	1:	Consider	whether	p	is	true.		
Step	2:	If	it	is,	then	conclude	that	one	believes	that	p.		For	the	reasons	we	explained	in	§7,	we	agree	with	many	would-be	critics	of	the	transparency	method	that	it	is	incredible	that	such	a	process	should	be	the	ground	of	doxastic	self-knowledge.	That	is,	if	this	process	is	understood	so	that	the	judgment	(or	appearance	of	truth,	or	proposition	judged)	generated	in	Step	1	functions	as	evidence	justifying	the	doxastic	self-ascription	in	Step	2,	the	proposal	in	question	is	just	a	version	of	the	view	that	we	have	been	arguing	against.	It	is	not	an	account	of	non-empirical	self-knowledge.	However,	as	long	as	the	empirical	conception	of	doxastic	self-knowledge	is	taken	for	granted,	it	will	seem	inevitable	that	the	method	of	transparency	should	be	construed	in	this	way—as	a	process	by	which	beliefs	about	one’s	own	beliefs	are	justified.	But	what	is	Evans	offering,	if	not	an	account	in	which	a	believer’s	view	‘on	the	world’	feeds	into	a	process	that	results	in	well-grounded	doxastic	self-ascriptions?	We	propose	that	the	key	to	avoiding	this	misinterpretation	is	to	see	that,	for	the	person	who	knows	her	belief	transparently,	the	judgments	‘p’	and	‘I	believe	that	p’	are	not	separable	in	the	way	that	the	empirical	conception	assumes	they	must	be.	To	say	that	these	judgments	are	not	separable	is	to	say	that,	for	the	self-knowing	believer,	the	questions	they	address—respectively,	whether	p	and	whether	she	believes	that	p—do	not	concern	distinct	matters,	such	that	her	answer	to	one	could	be	the	basis	of	her	answer	to	the	other.15		There	are	at	least	two	ways	that	this	inseparability	can	be	understood.	
Constitutivist	theories	hold	that	we	can	have	non-empirical	knowledge	of	our	beliefs	because	to	take	oneself	to	believe	something	is,	at	least	in	the	right	conditions,	also	to	believe	it.16	As	long	as	the	self-ascription	through	which	belief	is	supposed	to	be	constituted	is	not	grounded	empirically,	such	a	view	would	avoid	our	objections	to	the	empirical	conception.	We	note,	however,	an	important	barrier	to	making	good	sense	of	Constitutivist	proposals:	they	seem	to	require	seeing	doxastic	self-attribution	as	entirely	groundless,	as	the	product	of	a	brute	disposition																																																									14	For	misinterpretation	(or	creative	reconstruction)	along	these	lines,	see	Fernández	(2003);	Byrne	(2011);	Gertler	(2011,	188-190);	Cassam	(2014,	3-5	and	
passim).	15	Cf.	Moran	(2001,	§	2.6).	16	Recent	Constitutivist	proposals	include	Heal	(2001),	Schwitzgebel	(2011),	and	Coliva	(2012).	
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or	something	along	these	lines.17	This	avoids	the	pitfalls	of	the	empirical	conception	but	is	hardly	a	credible	interpretation	of	Evans’s	insight,	nor	do	we	find	it	to	possess	much	independent	plausibility	of	its	own.			An	alternative	to	Constitutivism	is	the	Self-Conscious	Conception	of	doxastic	self-knowledge.	This	conception	reverses	the	Constitutivist’s	order	of	explanation,	holding	that	it	is	in	the	nature	of	belief	to	be	self-conscious,	and	that	because	of	this	a	person	does	not	need	to	rely	on	introspection	or	any	other	empirical	process	as	a	source	of	knowledge	of	her	beliefs.	The	thought	is	not	that	(as	for	the	Constitutivist)	the	thinker	simply	finds	herself	believing	that	she	believes	that	p	and,	in	virtue	of	this	fact,	believes	that	p.	Rather,	according	to	the	Self-Conscious	Conception	a	person	is	ordinarily	in	a	position	to	grasp	what	she	believes	simply	in	virtue	of	believing	it,	as	it	is	part	of	what	it	is	to	view	a	proposition	with	the	belief-attitude	that	one	thereby	knows	oneself	to	so	view	it.	Developing	this	approach	in	detail	requires	explaining	how	it	could	be	in	the	nature	of	a	psychological	attitude	like	belief	to	be	non-empirically	self-known—a	task	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper.18	Nothing	in	what	we	have	argued	here	bears	directly	on	the	question	of	which	of	these	accounts	(or	perhaps	some	other)	of	transparent	self-knowledge	is	the	right	one.	Our	central	contention	is	that	some	explanation	of	how	there	can	be	non-empirical	knowledge	of	belief	is	required	for	an	adequate	account	of	honest	assertion.	Full	development	of	this	position	is	work	for	another	occasion.			 	
																																																								17	Among	contemporary	Constitutivists,	Schwitzgebel	(2011)	is	notable	in	embracing	this	consequence.	18	See	Boyle	(2011)	and	Marcus	(2016)	for	work	in	this	vein.	
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